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The Orange Revolution appeared to be an event of crucial importance for the whole 
post-Soviet space. Although supported by Moscow, Ukrainian President Leonid 
Kuchma did not manage to pass power to his designated „successor“ and to repeat 
in such a way the „Yeltsin – Putin scenario“. Falsiﬁcation of the 2004 Presidential 
elections led to massive, yet non-violent, protests known as Orange Revolution. In 
the 2006 Freedom House ratings Ukraine was recognized as the only free country 
among all other post-Soviet states (with the exception of the Baltic States). Were 
all these developments unexpected? Was it a Western plot as often depicted in 
Russian media or a product, ﬁrst of all, of internal development? How deep are the 
transformations and what are the handicaps? 
From Independence to the Crisis of Kuchma’s Regime 
After Ukraine gained independence, there were discussions in the international 
press if the new country was viable, predictions about future interethnic conﬂicts, 
and Ukraine’s turning „back to Eurasia“. It never happened. Ukrainian independence 
transformed the status of the previously provincial elite. Independence of the coun-
try became one of the dominant values of the elite. Russian-speaking leaders do 
not feel excluded from the political struggle in Kyiv, and they ﬁnd it more realistic 
to compete for seats and resources in Kyiv than in Moscow. 
Since the late 1980’s and the peaceful transition to independence crises in Uk-
rainian politics resulted in political compromises within ruling elites. In 1994, for 
the ﬁrst time in the post-Soviet space, a peaceful transition of power was made 
as a result of Presidential elections. The 1996 Constitution reﬂected a reasonable 
compromise between the President and the parliament, between left and right 
forces in the parliament itself. At the same time, as a result of compromises con-
stantly made in Ukrainian politics since 1990, former Communist nomenklatura 
remained in power, democratic opposition was weakened, and the economic re-
forms were stalled.
After his re-election in fall 1999, Leonid Kuchma promised to become „a new 
President“. In December 1999, the pro-market head of the National Bank of Ukraine, 
Viktor Yushchenko was approved as Prime Minister. Since 2000 the country has 
posted impressive positive economic growth rates after a decade of economic 
decline (for example, in 2000 the GDP increased by 6 %, in 2001 – by 9 %). This 
trend is usually attributed to favorable external market conditions and the policy 
of Prime Minister Yushchenko who started to reduce arbitrary administrative inter-
1 Freedom in the World 2006 (http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.
cfm?page=15&year=2006).
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ference in the economy, provided for stable payment schemes in the energy sector, 
and cut inﬂation down.
Despite this progress, the authoritarian trend in Kuchma’s policy was growing. 
European institutions strongly criticized the 2000 referendum which was held on 
a very loose legal basis to give the President broader authority. As a result of this 
criticism as well as opposition within the country, Ukraine’s Constitutional Court 
threw out two of six proposed questions and stipulated that the results of the re-
ferendum should be implemented through the proper parliamentary procedure. 
Because of opposition to his plans, Kuchma lacked forces to implement the results 
of the referendum through the parliament.
In general, during Kuchma’s second term (1999–2004) Ukraine faced a serious 
decline of civil rights, rule of law and fair government. Political scandals around 
journalist Gongadze’s murder, intimidation of political opposition and independent 
media resulted in growing social dissatisfaction with the state institutions. In the 
Western press Ukraine was often depicted in black color (criticism of Kuchma and 
corrupted state bureaucracy). Also, the West after the 9/11 events was concen-
trated on dealing with Putin, and Kyiv faced the danger of being in the shadow 
of Russia. 
However, in this approach one important factor was missed. In Russia there was 
no real opposition to President Putin. In Ukraine, democratic forces still fought for 
power, and the political system remained quite pluralistic which was explained by: 
1) quite strong democratic opposition in the parliament; 2) competition between 
oligarchic groups within the ruling elite. 
Origins of the Revolution:  
Democracy and Sovereignty vs. „Corrupted, Criminal Regime“
At the beginning of 2000s Ukrainian politics faced the evolution of a new 
strong non-leftist opposition, which presented an alternative view of the moder-
nization of Ukrainian state and nation in conformity with democratic values. The 
main force of this opposition, the Our Ukraine bloc, held by former Prime Minister 
Viktor Yushchenko, included not only the traditional national-democratic opposi-
tion but also former state executives who protested against Kuchma’s crony capi-
talism and corruption. Despite restrictions from the authorities, Our Ukraine won 
the ﬁrst place on party slates in the 2002 parliamentary elections, and Yushchenko 
emerged as the leading candidate in the 2004 Presidential race.
Among politicians loyal to Kuchma Viktor Yanukovych, the Prime Minister since 
November 2002 and representative of the Donetsk group, had the highest personal 
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rating (primarily because of his administrative position). His past, especially two 
terms of imprisonment, weakened his position, and in the view of Kuchma and his 
administration would make Yanukovych dependent on kompromat and potenti-
ally could serve as strings to control his future political actions and to guarantee 
security of Kuchma and his entourage.
Throughout the election campaign the Presidential administration did ever-
ything possible, so that Yushchenko could not win the elections. Kuchma himself 
„predicted“ that it would be the dirtiest campaign in the Ukrainian history.
Their main card was to present Yushchenko as a radical nationalist who is going 
to oppress the Russian-speaking population, whereas Yanukovych was portrayed 
as a decent public servant and a great friend of Russia.1 Russian and Ukrainian 
consultants of Yanukovych started to promote an idea of a „schism“ in Ukraine 
between „nationalistic“ West and „industrial“ East.2 
Russian authorities openly supported the Yanukovych campaign. President Vla-
dimir Putin agreed to restructure $US 800 million of Ukrainian debt for purchased 
gas and decided to repeal value-added tax on oil export to Ukraine starting Janu-
ary 1, 2005. Moreover, on October 26, ﬁve days before the ﬁrst round of voting, 
Putin made a visit to Kyiv and praised the Yanukovych government. To support 
Yanukovych before the run-off (November 21), Russian Duma adopted a law on 
weakening the control regime for Ukrainians traveling to Russia. Also, President 
Putin ordered to prepare legal instruments for the introduction of dual citizenship 
with Ukraine – another electoral promise made by Yanukovych. However, as the 
2 Although most Russian analysts considered Viktor Yanukovych as a possible ‘pro-Russian’ 
candidate for the Ukrainian presidency, it was a simpliﬁcation. As an example, Ukraine was 
ahead of Russia in the process of joining the WTO, the Yanukovych government continued ne-
gotiations with the WTO in this direction. The Russian side demanded ‘coordination’ (disclosure 
of the Ukrainian documents signed with the WTO countries, which contradicts WTO practice), 
but the Ukrainian side refused this request. When Russia laid territorial claims to the tiny but 
strategically important island of Tuzla in October 2003, this caused stormy protests in Ukraine, 
including then Ukrainian ofﬁcials. Even  more important: it was clear that the Donetsk group 
would defend ﬁrst of all their own interests which often come in contradiction with interests 
of more powerful Russian oligarchs and state-controlled monopolies. For more on Russian-
Ukrainian relations under Kuchma, see: Ukraine at a crossroads /Eds. Nicolas Hayoz, Andrej 
Lushnycky. – Bern: Peter Lang, 2005. – PP. 167-194.
3 On real, imagined, and cleavages artiﬁcially deepened by politicians, see the special issue of 
the journal „National Security and Defence“, no. 7 (79), 2006 (http://www.uceps.org.ua/eng/) 
published by the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies named after Olexander 
Razumkov (The Razumkov Center).
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further development showed, open interference appeared counter-productive and 
only discredited Yanukovych.
Despite regime’s control over mass media and the use of administrative resour-
ces, the opposition was successful in depicting Yanukovych as a continuation of 
Kuchma’s regime and in disseminating information about Yanukovych’s past and 
his economic policy, which ended in a sharp growth of prices on gasoline and food. 
On the other hand, the Yushchenko team declared its desire to get rid of „state 
capture“ by clans, to decrease administrative pressure on businesses, abolish the 
tax police and lighten tax burdens. Thus, small and medium business supported 
Yushchenko. Moreover, he was supported by the „second layer“ of Ukrainian large 
business. The ﬁrst layer supported Kuchma but in reality many of them were not 
happy about Yanukovych as well and some of them even showed signs of such a 
disagreement and were playing with both sides.
According to exit polls, Yushchenko won the elections by 7 % in the ﬁrst round 
and by 9 % in the run-off.4 However, frauds were widely used, and after the ﬁrst 
round the Central Election Commission (CEC) counted the votes for 10 days (!) to 
recognize Yushchenko’s victory (ofﬁcial result was 39.87 % against 39.32 % gai-
ned by Yanukovych). On November 24, the CEC declared Yanukovych the winner in 
the run-off (49.56 % against 46.61 %). Thus, the changes in favor of Yanukovych 
comprised almost 12 % (and in the center of the country – 17.4 %)!5 
Culmination: „Orange Revolution“
The live-broadcasted session of CEC on November 24, 2004, which declared Ya-
nukovych winner after obvious and cynical violations, only increased the scope 
of mass protests. It is no secret that the opposition knew about such scenario of 
Presidential administration and prepared to call people to the streets. But even 
Yushchenko and his radical and charismatic ally, Yulia Tymoshenko, perhaps, did 
not expect such gigantic non-stop rallies all over Ukraine which combined the 
celebration of the „orange“ victory (color of Yushchenko) with protests against 
falsiﬁcations. The civil movement against falsiﬁcations was joined by journalists 
protesting against manipulation and censorship, and the policy of main channels 
changed to a quite balanced coverage.
When the protests started, the authorities did not manage to provoke the vi-
olent clashes which they expected. In this situation, another scenario was used: 
4 Conducted by the respectable Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and the Razumkov 
Center.,
5 Ibid.
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three governors of eastern oblasts started to blackmail Yushchenko by the possible 
creation of a ‘South-Eastern autonomous republic’, and Kharkiv governor even re-
fused to make payments to the state budget. Yushchenko team immediately bla-
med Yanukovych supporters of separatism and demanded from Kuchma to act as 
the guarantor of the Ukrainian territorial integrity. Many local authorities did not 
side with separatist slogans. In fact, Yushchenko won not only in the West and the 
center of the country. He moved to northeastern Chernihiv and Sumy regions, and 
won almost half of the votes in the southern Kherson oblast. In the Ukrainian capital 
he ofﬁcially secured 75 % of the votes. Even oligarchs around Kuchma like Pinchuk 
and Akhmetov (the main business ﬁgure behind Yanukovych) were not interested 
in splitting the country, as their access to world markets would suffer.
The Ukrainian parliament, Verkhovna Rada, denounced separatism, declared 
that the results of the run-off were distorted, expressed non-conﬁdence to the 
CEC and then, on December 1, to the Yanukovych government.
On November 29, the Supreme Court of Ukraine started to examine Yushchenko’s 
complaint on the decision of the CEC. The live broadcast of its session revealed the 
scale of falsiﬁcations to the country and the international community. Interna-
tional mediators including the EU High Representative for the Common Security 
and Foreign Policy Javier Solana, Polish President Alexander Kwasniewski, OSCE 
Secretary General Jan Kubish, Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus also played an 
important role in persuading Kuchma, Yushchenko and Yanukovych to wait until 
the Supreme Court makes its ﬁnal decision about elections.
Kuchma and Putin were eager to have a new Presidential campaign (from 
the very beginning). It seems that it was one of the initial scenarios of Kuchma’s 
administration, though they did not expect such strong protests from Ukrainians 
as well as from the international community. On the contrary, opposition and the 
West insisted on repeating the run-off.
The decision of the Supreme Court on December 3 to repeat the run-off on 
December 26 was a powerful blow to Kuchma and Yanukovych. In fair elections 
Yushchenko got 52 %, and Yanukovych – 44, 2 %. 
To sum up, the main factors leading to Yushchenko’s victory and the success 
of the peaceful protests were: 
1) Weakness of the regime and relative pluralism of the Ukrainian political system 
compared to Russia and most post-Soviet states;
2) support of small and medium business (middle class);
3) split within large business groups dissatisﬁed with growing authoritarianism;
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4) maturity of civil society;
5) international condemnation of the falsiﬁcations and ﬁrm Western position in 
demanding Kuchma to restrain from the use of force.
Handicaps for Reforms
After inauguration the new leadership of Ukraine enjoyed the highest level of pu-
blic support since 1991. Further, members of former pro-Kuchma majority in the 
Rada interested in political survival began to re-brand themselves as supporters 
of the Orange Revolution. Under the same umbrella, many members of the former 
nomenklatura have been included into new power structures at regional and local 
levels. A group of former high-ranking ofﬁcers and tycoons ﬂed the country, some 
of them for Russia. The former ministers of internal affairs and of transportation 
committed suicide.
The absence of effective opposition and high social expectations created a 
window of opportunity for accelerated reforms. On the other hand, there were at 
least three main handicaps for implementing reforms:
1) the constitutional reform which would weaken the role of the presidency, 
leaving him only one year to implement reforms;
2) the country within a year slid from Presidential to parliamentary campaign, 
hence the growing populism in Ukrainian politics;
3) differentiation and internal disagreements within the broad coalition in po-
wer.
One of the main impediments for Yushchenko’s course arises from a contra-
dictory compromise reached in the Ukrainian parliament on December 8, 2004 
(between the fraudulent second round and the run off). It stipulated that the con-
stitutional reform would be effective from January 1, 2006. Prime Minister would 
rely on parliamentary majority and he/she cannot be removed by President at any 
time like it was before – a step in the right direction, demanded by democratic 
forces for many years. On the other hand, the reform appeared to be hectic and 
inconsistent. One could mention, as an example, the ability of the parliament to 
dismiss any minister by simple majority, which would make ministers dependent 
on lobbyist groups in the parliament.
As the reform would weaken the role of the presidency and, consequently, in-
crease the importance of the March 2006 parliamentary election, its adoption de-
creased the fears of pro-Kuchma forces over Yushchenko’s victory and thus eased 
the way for the run off. However, Yushchenko was elected with broad scope of 
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authority, but in a year it would diminish. Therefore, the plan of Kuchma to limit 
the power of the future President whoever is elected (Yushchenko or Yanukovych) 
seemed to be materialized. But he and his entourage did not expect the Orange 
Revolution which put at risk their personal legal status and led to the democrati-
zation of the country.6
After Yushchenko’s victory there was a debate among Ukrainian politicians 
and analysts about the question if the reform should be implemented as several 
constitutional changes have not been approved in advance by the Constitutional 
Court. Therefore, it was possible to check with the Constitutional Court the lega-
lity of the whole procedure of constitutional changes. However, Yushchenko did 
not use this possibility. Perhaps, he did not want to change on his own initiative 
the compromise reached by Ukrainian elites. In this situation, to get rid of incon-
sistencies of the reform might become possible only when the new parliament 
would be elected.
Growing populism in Ukrainian politics on the eve of the upcoming parliamen-
tary election in March 2006 led to a decline in economic performance and to the 
split between the liberal Yushchenko and the more populist and state-oriented 
Prime Minister Tymoshenko in September 2005. 
The most difﬁcult task for Yushchenko was to harmonize competing variants 
of reforms represented in the leadership of this coalition (which also included left-
center Socialists) into a uniﬁed vision. The second task was to accomplish urgent 
reforms given limited resources and time. 
Although the Yanukovych government beneﬁted from 12 percent economic 
growth rate in its last year, its populist measures of increasing salaries and pen-
sions created a deﬁcit of $ 3.7 bln for the 2005 budget. As he needed to react in 
the Presidential campaign, Yushchenko also promised to increase social spending. 
Preparing new budget and increasing social payments, the Tymoshenko cabinet 
increased the deﬁcit to $ 6.3 bln. After nearly all parliamentary factions appro-
ved it, Yushchenko agreed to sign it, on the grounds that the deﬁcits were justi-
ﬁed by the population’s low incomes. At the same time, President demanded that 
the cabinet should ﬁnd new ways to ease the administrative and ﬁscal burden on 
businesses and to stimulate the legitimate economy at the expense of Ukraine’s 
shadow economy.
6 For more about Kuchma’s constitutional games, see: Olexiy Haran, Rostyslav Pavlenko. Political 
Reform or a Game of Survival for President Kuchma? (November 2003, No. 294) http://www.
csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,2170/
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However, Tymoshenko implemented strong administrative remedies, which 
bought stunning success in the beginning and failure at the end of the day. One 
of the greatest successes was a program to stop smuggling, which increased paid 
duties by 200 percent over 2004. The cabinet also succeeded in collecting more 
taxes from businesses, although increasing the ﬁscal pressure on small and me-
dium enterprises. Businesses waited in vain for a promised economic amnesty to 
entrepreneurs forced to work in shadow economy. Cabinet’s actions shocked the 
business community that had expected more liberal treatment. They felt deceived 
and returned to old schemes of avoiding taxation. Administrative pressures could 
not stop the increase of prices for meat and sugar, while the massive ﬂow of social 
spending accelerated the growth of consumer prices. Tymoshenko tried to force oil 
companies to sell fuel at ﬁxed prices, but Russian giants (including Lukoil, TNK-
BP, and Tatneft) warned President Yushchenko that such a policy could end in an 
energy crisis, and the President canceled Tymoshenko’s decisions. 
During the 2004 campaign Yushchenko had promised to reconsider the cases 
of privatization taken under dubious and sometimes illegal conditions, especially 
the metallurgical giant Kryvorizhstal, obtained at a very low price by Donetsk 
oligarch Rinat Akhmetov (who supported Yanukovych for presidency) and Viktor 
Pinchuk, Kuchma’s son-in-law. After the election, Yushchenko supported the idea 
of re-privatizing 20–30 enterprises of strategic importance to the country. Tymo-
shenko, however, suggested the potential re-privatization of 3,000 ﬁrms. Later, she 
said she was misunderstood. Tymoshenko also canceled special economic zones as 
she declared them to be tools for tax avoidance arrangements. As a result, invest-
ments to Ukraine declined. Nevertheless, the Kryvorizhstal re-privatization case was 
ultimately successful. At an auction shown on TV, Mittal Steel paid $ 4.8 billion, 
6 times higher than the price given during the ﬁrst privatization by Akhmetov and 
Pinchuk. It exceeded all the revenues from privatization of Ukrainian enterprises 
since 1991 by 20 %.
Split of Orange Forces and the 2006 Parliamentary Elections
The split between Yushchenko and more radical Tymoshenko was predicted by 
analysts from the very beginning. In early September 2005 Yushchenko dismissed 
the entire cabinet and appointed his close associate Yuri Yekhanurov as acting 
Prime Minister. Yekhanurov failed to gain sufﬁcient support on the ﬁrst vote, but 
was conﬁrmed by the Verkhovna Rada on September 23 on a second vote. He pro-
mised to stop re-privatization campaign (with the exception of Kryvorizhstal and 
Nikopol ferro-alloy mill). Yekhanurov’s approval as Prime Minister in parliament 
was supported even by Pinchuk’s political group and by the Donetsk-based Party 
of Regions led by Yanukovych and supported by Akhmetov. 
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As a result of political compromises leading to Yekhanurov’s conﬁrmation, Ty-
moshenko supporters accused Yushchenko of reconciling with former pro-Kuchma 
factions based on a declaration on stabilization in Ukraine and a special me-
morandum with Yanukovych. However, as Tymoshenko’s faction did not support 
Yekhanurov during the conﬁrmation, Yushchenko needed to secure support from 
other factions.
No matter how observers of East European politics assess the situation in post-
orange Ukraine, they agree that the parliamentary elections of March 26, 2006 were 
held in a free and fair manner. Despite fears to the contrary, the turnout appeared 
quite high, up to 67 %. The Party of Regions led by Yanukovych beneﬁted from the 
Yushchenko-Tymoshenko rivalry, blamed democrats for economic difﬁculties and 
gained the biggest share of the votes (32.1 percent). Tymoshenko’s anti-oligarchic 
and anti-corruption rhetoric resulted in increased electoral support for her party 
(22.3). The pro-Presidential party, Our Ukraine, ﬁnished only third (13.9).
Actually, the voting pattern was quite stable when measured against the 
2004 Presidential election. The former Orange coalition (including Yushchenko 
and Tymoshenko’s parties plus other forces) pulled down 46 percent of the vote 
in 2006, compared with 52 percent in 2004. Yanukovych’s camp support also so-
mewhat declined, from 44 percent in 2004 to about 40 percent in 2006 (inclu-
ding here votes for Communists and other forces which supported Yanukovych in 
the 2004 run off). The results of the local elections in 2006 also showed that the 
orange regions remained orange, and the blue regions (supporting Yanukovych’s 
party) remained blue. However, at regional and local levels party composition of 
the councils is more diverse than in the parliament, and in some cases there are 
orange mayors in blue regions and vice versa, which would make different forces 
to ﬁnd a form of cohabitation. 
As far as „Our Ukraine“ won 82 parliamentary seats it was up to the Presi-
dent to decide whether to form a coalition with the Party of Regions (183 seats) 
or with the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (129 seats) and the Socialists (30 seats). Both 
variants were under serious consideration and had their pros and cons. The likely 
ruling coalition to emerge could include Yushchenko and Tymoshenko’s blocs (plus 
the Socialists), with Tymoshenko emerging once again as Prime Minister as she 
received strong negotiating cards after her good electoral performance. However, 
many within Our Ukraine would prefer another head of the new Orange cabinet; 
moreover, negotiations started to create a so called grand coalition between Our 
Ukraine and the Party of Regions (based on their agreement that the cabinet would 
be headed by Yekhanurov, and Yanukovych would remain only leader of the par-
liamentary faction).
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It was evident that if the Party of Regions presents itself in a manner that de-
monstrates it has learned from its experience at the end of 2004, there will be a 
certain differentiation and reconﬁguration of forces within it, which would enable 
them to become a more respectable political player. However, Yushchenko’s elec-
torate could not understand the alliance with Yanukovych and vice versa.7 Most 
of the electorate preferred the restoration of the Orange coalition which again 
received a majority.
Termidor: Building Coalition Government in the New Constitutional Framework8 
During and after the 2006 parliamentary elections Ukrainian elites demonstrated 
again a peaceful, although tense and dramatic, sharing of power between the ru-
ling groups and the opposition and a using of compromises for settling political 
disputes. At the same time, political process in Ukraine is still shaped by shadow 
decision-making, sharp conﬂicts between executive and legislative bodies, central 
and local governments. These factors were aggravated by the introduction of the 
constitutional reform and the installation of the new three-polar political system, in 
which the alliance of either two of the three main centers of power (the President, 
the speaker and the prime-minister) seemed to have the potential to overwhelm 
the „outsider“ top-ofﬁcial and dictate „rules of the game“. 
According to the amended Constitution, a ruling parliamentary coalition shall 
be constructed in 30 days after the ﬁrst plenary meeting of the new parliament. 
Otherwise, the President has the right to dissolve the parliament and initiate early 
elections. As Yushchenko had a loyal acting Prime Minister and cabinet, in case of 
the new elections he would remain the chief political player.
After three months of negotiations and developing a common program of 
government’s activity, all three „orange“ parties agreed on June 22 to create a 
coalition with Tymoshenko as Prime Minister and a representative of „Our Ukraine“ 
as speaker.
However, on July 6, 2006, in violation of the previous agreement (without any 
notiﬁcation and during the voting process) Moroz, the leader of Socialists, was put 
7 Polls by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology and „Democratic Initiatives“ Foundation 
(April 27–May 4) showed that only 38 percent of population supported „grand coalition“ bet-
ween former rivals, Yanukovych and Yushchenko, and 47 percent preferred restoration of the 
„Orange coalition“.
8 The ﬁnal part of this paper is based on the presentation „From Presidentialism to Parliamentarism: 
Strengthening or Weakening of Democracy in Ukraine?“ prepared for a policy conference at the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC, December 7, 2006.
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forward by his own party as a candidate for speaker and was elected by 238 votes 
from his own party, the Party of Regions and the Communists. Thus, the so called 
„anti-crisis“ coalition emerged, and Yanukovych was put forward as a candidate 
for Prime Minister. Consequently, „Our Ukraine“ and Yulia Timoshenko’s Bloc bla-
med Moroz for betraying his voters as his party objected to Yanukovych in 2004 
and coalition with Party of Regions (PR) in 2006 elections. 
In this situation Yushchenko faced a difﬁcult political and constitutional di-
lemma. He had the possibility to call for new elections after July 26 using con-
stitutional provision to dissolve the parliament if the new cabinet of ministers is 
not formed within 60 days after the resignation of the previous government. But 
this would mean a further polarization of the country. The other question was if 
the President had the constitutional right not to introduce Yanukovych as Prime 
Minister. The only body to solve it was the Constitutional Court. But its formation 
was blocked by the parliamentarians for a year: they feared that it could cancel 
the constitutional reform.
After two weeks of uncertainty Yushchenko decided to call for a „national round 
table“ to develop a document – a matrix of political compromise for all parlia-
mentary forces – as a prerequisite for introducing Yanukovych as a candidate for 
parliamentary approval. The idea was to outline the course for the new cabinet and 
make Yanukovych agree with pro-Western orientation and democratic values. To 
some extent, President’s initiative helped to stabilize the country. The text of the 
„Universal of National Unity“ was signed by all parties, except for Tymoshenko who 
decided to stay in ﬁrm opposition to Yanukovych. Despite Party of Region’s electo-
ral slogans for federalization, Ukraine was again characterized in the Universal as 
a unitary country (an important victory for the President). Moreover, the President 
succeeded to keep in cabinet not the only pro-Western Minister for Foreign Affairs 
and the Minister of Defense (constitutional „President’s quota“ in the cabinet) but 
even the Minister of Interior who was known by his strong accusations of many 
politicians from the Party of Regions for their activity contradicting the law. 
Delineation of Powers: To Be Continued
At the same time, the Universal was not a legally binding document. On the one 
hand, Yanukovych had to stress that it was not possible to introduce Russian as the 
ofﬁcial language as it would require constitutional changes and a national referen-
dum. Even the more important, many analysts believe that while stressing partner-
ship with Russia, Yanukovych would keep moving Ukraine to Europe, although in a 
more gradual and slow, „pragmatic“ way. On the other hand, the Yanukovych team 
started to monopolize key positions in governmental ofﬁces and state companies, 
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(almost 4/5 of newly appointed deputy ministers have their origins or made their 
careers in the Donetsk region). The Prime Minister declared that it is too early for 
Ukraine to join the NATO Membership Action Plan and de facto postponed joining 
the WTO until 2007. 
When Yushchenko appealed to the provisions of the Universal and reminded 
Yanukovych that he had to follow President’s instructions in foreign policy, Prime 
Minister’s ofﬁce stroke back. Yanukovych lawyers argued that the Constitution 
determines the right of the Prime Minister to countersign Presidential decrees 
concerning appointment and dismissal of ambassadors, declaration of emergency 
situation, creation of courts, and, which is most important, adoption of National 
Security and Defense Council decisions. This is a crucial point because President has 
2/3 members of NSDC loyal to him and with their help he still can produce orders 
obligatory for the Cabinet of Ministers. However, both sides after a war of words 
agreed to wait for the ofﬁcial decision of the Constitutional Court. 
Another Presidential lever of pressure is his legislative veto. For now Yanuko-
vych can rely only on 240–250 deputies but he needs 300 votes in order to overrule 
a possible Presidential veto on lobbied laws. On the other hand, Party of Regions 
showed that it could „persuade“ deputies using money or threats. They are trying 
to „collect“ 300 votes to amend the Constitution.
However, the stability of the „anti-crisis” coalition can also be questioned. Its 
left wing (the Socialists and the Communists) continued to support populist ini-
tiatives in spite of the complex economic conditions. In its turn, Yanukovych or-
dered to design the state budget for 2007 which favored big business of Donetsk 
and introduced social cuts. His party lost the struggle to get a majority and to 
nominate the heads of the Constitutional and Supreme Courts (ﬁrst one seems to 
have a pro-Presidential majority; the second one is headed by a representative of 
Tymoshenko’s bloc, while PR has strong positions in the Prosecutor General Ofﬁce). 
Also, the most popular press media and TV-channels remain quite independent and 
provide opportunities to criticize government’s failures. 
Prospects: Revolution Betrayed or Compromises to Moving Ahead?
The 2006 parliamentary elections conducted in a free environment created by the 
Orange revolution resulted in ﬁve political parties winning seats, with no party in 
the majority. This outcome will make Ukrainian parliament more structured along 
party lines. No matter the exact conﬁguration of the cabinet and the form of coha-
bitation between President Yushchenko – who despite the constitutional changes 
will certainly remain one of the most inﬂuential players in the arena – and the new 
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coalition government, the Ukrainian political system is ﬁnally loosing authorita-
rian features. The increased clarity of the division of powers moves Ukraine closer 
to European standards.
However, the new system emerged after the constitutional reform needs to be 
adjusted in order to maintain stability. Now President and Prime Minister are trying 
to secure separate and sometimes parallel structures of their power. For the time 
being, the present system reminds to a certain extent the French „double executive“ 
model in cohabitation periods where Prime Minister and President compete with 
each other but, at the same time, must cooperate to ensure stability and govern 
the country. This situation can be used by a quite strong parliamentary opposition 
to criticize the government while for the moment Tymoshenko is striving for the 
role of Yushchenko’s „successor“ in 2009. 
Taking into consideration the fact that the next election cycle will start in 
2009–2011, the crucial things which can prevent a restoration of the oligarchic 
rule are the court system which is to be reformed, free media, and effective strong 
opposition.
Finally, there is a niche and demand for the creation of a new opposition of Eu-
ropean type based not on a leader but on programmatic and ideological values.
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